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Abstract. Modern networks achieve robustness and scalability by maintaining
states on their nodes. These nodes are referred to as middleboxes and are essen-
tial for network functionality. However, the presence of middleboxes drastically
complicates the task of network verification. Previous work showed that the prob-
lem is undecidable in general and EXPSPACE-complete when abstracting away
the order of packet arrival.
We describe a new algorithm for conservatively checking isolation properties of
stateful networks. The asymptotic complexity of the algorithm is polynomial in
the size of the network, albeit being exponential in the maximal number of queries
of the local state that a middlebox can do, which is often small.
Our algorithm is sound, i.e., it can never miss a violation of safety but may fail to
verify some properties. The algorithm performs on-the fly abstract interpretation
by (1) abstracting away the order of packet processing and the number of times
each packet arrives, (2) abstracting away correlations between states of different
middleboxes and channel contents, and (3) representing middlebox states by their
effect on each packet separately, rather than taking into account the entire state
space. We show that the abstractions do not lose precision when middleboxes
may reset in any state. This is encouraging since many real middleboxes reset,
e.g., after some session timeout is reached or due to hardware failure.
1 Introduction
Modern computer networks are extremely complex, leading to many bugs and vul-
nerabilities that affect our daily life. Therefore, network verification is an increasingly
important topic addressed by the programming languages and networking communi-
ties [16,4,14,15,13,29,22,11]. Previous network verification tools leverage a simple net-
work forwarding model, which renders the datapath immutable. That is, normal packets
going through the network do not change its forwarding behaviour, and the control
plane explicitly alters the forwarding state at relatively slow time scales.
While the notion of an immutable datapath supported by an assemblage of routers
makes verification tractable, it does not reflect reality. Middleboxes are widespread in
modern enterprise networks [30]. A simple example of a middlebox is a stateful firewall
which permits traffic from untrusted hosts only after they have received a packet from
a trusted host. Middleboxes, such as firewalls, WAN optimizers, transcoders, proxies,
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2Fig. 1: A middlebox chain with a buggy topology.
load-balancers and the like, are the most common way to insert new functionality in the
network datapath, and are commonly used to improve network performance and secu-
rity. Middleboxes maintain a state and may change their state and forwarding behavior
in response to packet arrivals. While useful, middleboxes are a common source of errors
in the network [26].
As a simple example, consider the middlebox chain described in Fig. 1. In this net-
work, a firewall is used to ensure that low security hosts (l1, . . . , lm) do not receive
packets from the Sh server, and a cache and load balancer are used to improve perfor-
mance. Unfortunately, the configuration of the network is incorrect since the cache may
respond with a stored packet, bypassing the security policy enforced by the firewall.
Swapping the order of the cache and the firewall results in a correct configuration.
Safety of Stateful Networks. We address the problem of verifying safety of networks
with middleboxes, referred to as stateful networks. We target verification of isolation
properties, namely, that packets sent from one host (or class of hosts) can never reach
another host (or class of hosts). Yet, our approach is sound for any safety property. For
example, it detects the safety violation described in Fig. 1, and verifies the safety of the
correct configuration of this network.
Our focus is on verifying the configuration of stateful networks, i.e., addressing er-
rors that arise from the interactions between middleboxes, and not from the complexity
of individual middleboxes. Hence, we follow [34] and use an abstraction of middle-
boxes as finite-state programs. Previous work [34,31] has shown that many kinds of
middleboxes, including proxy, cache proxy, NAT, and various kinds of load-balancers
can be modeled in this way, sometimes using non-determinism to over-approximate the
behaviour, e.g. to model timers, counters, etc. Since we are interested in safety proper-
ties, such an abstraction (overapproximation) is suitable.
As shown in [34], it is undecidable to check safety properties in general and iso-
lation in particular, even for middleboxes with a finite state space, and even when the
order of packets pending for each middlebox is abstracted away the complexity is quite
high (EXPSPACE-complete). Therefore, in this paper we develop additional abstrac-
tions for scaling up the verification.
Our approach. This paper makes a first attempt to apply abstract interpretation [6]
to automatically prove the safety of stateful networks. Our approach combines sound
network-level abstractions and middlebox-level abstractions that, together, make the
verification task tractable. Roughly speaking, we apply (i) order abstraction [34], ab-
stracting away the order of packets on channels, (ii) counter abstraction [25], abstracting
3away their cardinality, (iii) network-level Cartesian abstraction [6,10,12], abstracting
away the correlation between the states of different middleboxes and different channel
contents, and (iv) middlebox-level Cartesian abstraction, abstracting away the correla-
tion between states of different packets within each middlebox.
The network-level abstractions, (i)-(iii), lead to a chaotic iteration algorithm that is
polynomial in the state space of the individual middleboxes and packets. However, the
number of middlebox states can be exponential in the size of the network. For example,
a firewall may record the set of trusted hosts and thus its states are subsets of hosts.
Therefore, the resulting analysis is exponential in the number of hosts6.
The middlebox-level Cartesian abstraction, (iv), is the key to reducing the complex-
ity to polynomial. The crux of this abstraction is the observation that the abstraction of
middleboxes as reactive processes that query and update their state in a restricted way
(e.g., [34]) allows to represent a middlebox state as a product of loosely-coupled packet
states, one per potential packet. This lets us define a novel, non-standard, semantics of
middlebox programs that we call packet effect semantics. The packet effect semantics
is equivalent (bisimilar) to the natural semantics. However, while the natural semantics
is monolithic, the packet effect semantics decomposes a single middlebox state into the
parts that determine the forwarding behavior of different packets, and therefore facili-
tates the use of Cartesian abstraction to further reduce the complexity.
One of the main challenges for abstract interpretation is evaluating its precision.
To address this challenge, we provide sufficient conditions that ensure precision of our
analysis. Namely, we show that if the network is safe in the presence of packet re-
ordering and middlebox reverts, where a middelbox may revert to its initial state at
any moment, then our analysis is guaranteed to be precise, and will never report false
alarms. This is, to a great extent, due to the packet effect semantics, which allows to
use a middlebox-level Cartesian abstraction without incurring additional precision loss
for such networks. Notice that middlebox reverts enable modelling arbitrary hardware
failures, which have not been addressed by previous work on stateful network verifica-
tion (e.g., in [34]). Surprisingly, verification becomes easier under the assumption that
middleboxes may reset at any time. (Recall that for arbitrary unordered networks safety
checking is EXPSPACE-complete.)
In summary, the main contributions of this paper are
– We introduce the first abstract interpretation algorithm for verifying safety of state-
ful networks, whose time complexity is polynomial in the size of the network, albeit
exponential in the maximal number of queries of the local state that a middlebox
can do, which is often small even for complex middelboxes (up to 5 in our exam-
ples).
– We develop packet effect semantics, a non-standard semantics of middelbox pro-
grams that facilitates middlebox-level Cartesian abstraction, reducing the complex-
ity of the abstract interpretation algorithm from exponential in the size of the net-
work to polynomial without incurring any additional precision loss for unordered
reverting networks.
6 Unfortunately, if the set of hosts is not fixed, the safety problem becomes undecidable (even
under the unordered abstraction) (Appendix F). This means that, in general, it is not possible
to alleviate the dependency of the complexity on the hosts.
4– We provide sufficient conditions for precision of the analysis that have a natural
interpretation in the domain of stateful networks: ignoring the order of packet pro-
cessing and letting middleboxes revert to their initial states at any time.
– We prove lower bounds on the complexity of safety verification in the presence of
packet reordering and/or middlebox reverts, showing that our algorithm is essen-
tially optimal.
– We implement our analysis and show that it scales well with the number of hosts
and middelboxes in the network.
We defer proofs of key claims to App. B .
2 Expressing Middlebox Effects
This section defines our programming language for modeling the abstract behavior of
middleboxes in the network. Our modeling language is independent of the particular
network topology, which is defined in Sec. 3. The proposed language, AMDL (Abstract
Middlebox Definition Language), is a restricted form of OCCAM [28], similar to the
languages of [34,31].
We first define the syntax and informal semantics of AMDL (Sec. 2.1); we then
define a formal “standard” relation effect semantics (Sec. 2.2); we continue by defining
an alternative packet effect semantics (Sec. 2.3), which is bisimilar to the relation effect
semantics (Sec. 2.4); and finally we present a localized version of the packet effect
semantics (Sec. 2.5), which is suitable for Cartesian abstraction.
Packets. Middlebox behavior in our model is defined with respect to packets that consist
of a fixed, finite, number of packet fields, ranging over finite domains. As such, a packet
p ∈ P in our formalism is a tuple of packet fields over predefined finite sorts. In our
examples, a packet is a tuple 〈s, d, t〉, where s, d are the source and destination hosts,
respectively, taken from a finite set of hosts H , and t is a packet tag (or type) that
ranges over a finite domain T . In this case, |P | is polynomial in |H|. (Our approach is
also applicable when additional fields are added, e.g., for modeling the packet’s payload
via an abstract finite domain.)
2.1 Syntax and Informal Semantics
Fig. 3 describes the syntax of the AMDL language7. Middleboxes are implemented as
reactive processes, with events triggered by the arrival of packets. If multiple pack-
ets are pending, the AMDL process non-deterministically reads a packet from one of
the incoming channels of the process. The packet processing code is a loop-free block
of guarded-commands, which may update relations and forward potentially modified
packets to some of the output ports. AMDL uses relations over finite domains to store
the middlebox state. These are the only data structures allowed in AMDL. The only
relation operations allowed are inserting a value to a relation, removing a value from
a relation, and membership queries — checking whether a value is in a relation. For a
7 In the code examples, we write p for the triple (src,dst,type) and use access path nota-
tion to refer to the fields, e.g., p.src.
5sfirewall = do
internal_port ? p =>
if
p.dst in trusted => external_port ! p

p.type = 0 => // request packet
external_port ! p;
requested(p.dst) := true
fi

external_port ? p =>
if
p.src in trusted => internal_port ! p

p.type = 1 and p.src in requested =>
// response packet with a request
trusted(p.src) := true
fi
od
Fig. 2: AMDL code for session firewall.
membership query of the form a in r, we denote the relation, r, used in the query by
rel(q) and denote the tuple of atoms a by atoms(q). For example, the code for a session
firewall is depicted in Fig. 2.
Middleboxes may enforce safety properties using the abort command. For example,
an isolation middlebox would abort when a forbidden packet is received.
2.2 Middlebox Relation Effect Semantics
We now sketch the semantics of AMDL. The definitions below supply a part of the full
network semantics, which is given in Sec. 3.
Middlebox States. Each middlebox m ∈ M maintains its own local state as a set of
relations. The domain of a relation r defined over sorts s1..k is D(r)
def
= D(s1)× . . .×
D(sk), where D(si) is the domain of sort si. We use rels(m) to denote the set of
relations in m, and D(m) to denote the union of D(r) over r ∈ rels(m).
The middlebox state of m is then a function s ∈ ΣR[m] def= rels(m) → ℘(D(m)),
mapping each r ∈ rels(m) to v ⊆ D(r). In addition, we introduce a unique error
middlebox state, denoted err. We assume that err ∈ ΣR[m] for every middlebox m.
Middlebox Transitions. Middlebox transitions have the form
(p,c)/(pi,ci)i=1..k−−−−−−−−−−−→R⊆ ΣR[m]×ΣR[m]
where (p, c) denotes packet-channel at the input, and (pi, ci)i=1..k is the sequence of
packet-channel pairs that the middlebox outputs.
6〈mbox〉 ::= m = do 〈pblock〉 [ 〈pblock〉]∗ od
〈pblock〉 ::= c ? pfld ⇒ 〈gc〉
〈gc〉 ::= 〈cond〉 ⇒ 〈action〉 | if 〈gc〉 [ 〈gc〉]∗ fi
〈action〉 ::= 〈action〉 ; 〈action〉 | c ! 〈atom〉 | r(〈atom〉) := 〈cond〉 | abort
〈cond〉 ::= true | 〈cond〉 and 〈cond〉 | not 〈cond〉 | 〈atom〉 = 〈atom〉 | 〈atom〉 in r
〈atom〉 ::= pfld | const
Fig. 3: AMDL syntax. e denotes a comma-separated list of elements drawn from the
domain e. abort imposes a safety condition. c ? p reads p from a channel c and c ! p
writes p into c. We write m for a middlebox name, r for a relation name, and c for
a channel name. We write const for a constant symbol and pfld for identifiers used to
match fields in packets, e.g., src. Non-deterministic choice is denoted by .
For example, for s def= [requested 7→ ∅,trusted 7→ ∅], the guarded command
corresponding to the internal port of the firewall middlebox (Fig. 2) induces a transition
s
((h1,h2,0),
→
cin)/((h1,h2,0),
→
cout)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→R s′ where s′ def= [requested 7→ {h2},trusted 7→
∅].
abort commands induce transitions to the err state.
The formal definition of the middlebox transitions appears in App. C.
2.3 Middlebox Packet Effect Semantics
We now present a semantics that is equivalent to the relation effect semantics. The
semantics is based on an alternative (yet isomorphic) representation of middlebox states
that reveals a loose coupling between the parts of the state that are relevant for different
packets. This loose coupling then facilitates a Cartesian abstraction that abstracts away
correlations between packets in the same state.
Packet Effect Representation of Middlebox State Recall that in Sec. 2.1 we restrict
the values that can be used in a middlebox program to either constants or the values of
fields of the currently processed packet. We do not allow extracting tuples from the rela-
tion (e.g., by having a get command, or by iterating over the contents of the relation).
Instead, we limit the interaction with the relation to checking whether a tuple (that con-
sists of packet fields or constants) exists in the relation. Consequently, instead of storing
the contents of all relations, the state of the middlebox can be represented by mapping
all potential packets in the network to their effect on the middlebox. Specifically, we
map each packet and membership query in the program to whether that membership
query will be evaluated to True when the program is executed on that packet.
For every middlebox m, we denote by Q(m) the set of membership queries in m’s
program. (We need not distinguish between different instances of the same query.) For
example, in Fig. 2, Q(fw) = {p.dst in trusted, p.src in trusted,
p.src in requested}.
The packet effect state of a middleboxm is a function s ∈ ΣP[m] def= P → Q(m)→
{True,False}, mapping each packet p ∈ P to the evaluation of all queries of m when
7p is the input packet, thus capturing the way in which p traversesm’s program. We refer
to s(p) ∈ Q(m)→ {True,False} as the packet state of packet p in middlebox state s.
We extend ΣP[m] with an error state λp ∈ P. err, which is also denoted err.
Middlebox Transition Relation in the Packet Space The semantics of middlebox m
in the packet space is defined via a transition relation
(p,c)/(pi,ci)i=1..k−−−−−−−−−−−→P,m⊆ ΣP[m]×
ΣP[m]. Whenm is clear, we omit it from the notation. A transition s˜
(p,c)/(pi,ci)i=1..k−−−−−−−−−−−→P
s˜′ exists if (one of) the sequence of operations applied on s˜ when packet p arrives on
channel c outputs (pi, ci)i=1..k and leads to s˜′.
The semantics of operations is defined similarly to the “standard” relation effect
semantics. The semantics of error and output actions (that do not change the middlebox
state) is straightforward. Next, we explain the semantics of the operations that depend
on or change the middlebox state — membership queries and relation updates.
Consider a membership query q. Let s˜ be the middlebox state before evaluating q,
i.e., s˜ is the state that results from executing all previous relation updates, and let p be
the packet that invoked the middlebox transition. Then q is evaluated to s˜(p)(q).
Next, consider a relation update. A relation update r(a) :=cond updates the packet
states of all packets that are affected by the operation. This is done as follows. As before,
let s˜ be the intermediate state of m right before executing the operation, and let p be
the packet that the middlebox program is operating on. Consider the case where cond
evaluates to True in s˜, corresponding to addition of a value. (Removal of a value is
symmetric.) We denote by a(p) the result of substituting each field name in a by its
value in p. That is, a(p) ∈ D(r) is the value being added to r. This addition may affect
the value of membership queries q ∈ Q(m) with rel(q) = r (querying the same relation
r) for other packets p˜ as well, in case that atoms(q)(p˜), i.e., the value being queried
on p˜, is the same as the value a(p) being added to r. Therefore, the intermediate state
obtained after the relation update operation has been applied is
s˜′ = λp˜ ∈ P. λq ∈ Q(m).
{
True, if rel(q) = r ∧atoms(q)(p˜) = a(p).
s˜(p˜)(q), otherwise.
Namely, the operation updates to True the value of queries that coincide with the tuple
of elements inserted to the relation.
Example 1. Consider the packet effect state s˜ def= λp. λq.False ∈ ΣP[fw] of the fire-
wall (Fig. 2), where q ranges over the three membership queries in the code. Upon
reading the packet (h1, h2, 0) from an internal port, the middlebox performs a se-
quence of internal transitions which includes evaluating the expression “p.type=0”
to True, outputting the packet (h1, h2, 0) to the output port, and executing the command
requested(p.dst) := true, which results in updating the state to:
s˜′ def= λp˜. λq.
{
True, if rel(q) = requested ∧ atoms(q)(p˜) = h2
False, otherwise.
That is, s˜′((h2, ∗, ∗))(p.src in requested) = True and all the other values
in s˜′ remain False as before. Therefore, s˜
((h1,h2,0),
→
cin)/((h1,h2,0),
→
cout)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→P s˜′. uunionsq
82.4 Bisimulation of Packet Effect Semantics and Relation Effect Semantics
We continue by showing that the transition systems defining the semantics of middle-
boxes in the packet effect and in the relation effect representations are bisimilar.
To do so, we first define a mapping ps : ΣR[m] → ΣP[m] from the relation state
representation to the packet effect state representation. Recall that the relation state
representation of middlebox states is s ∈ ΣR[m] def= rels(m) → ℘(D(m)). Given a
state s ∈ ΣR[m], ps maps it to the packet effect state sP defined as follows:
sP
def
= λp˜ ∈ P. λq ∈ Q(m). atoms(q)(p˜) ∈ s(rel(q)).
That is, for every input packet p˜, the value in sP of the query q ∈ Q(m) is equal to the
evaluation of the same query in s based on an input packet p˜.
Definition 1 (Bisimulation Relation). For a middleboxm, we define the relation∼m⊆
ΣR[m]×ΣP[m] as the set of all pairs (s, sp) such that s = sp = err or ps(s) = sp.
Lemma 1. Let s ∈ ΣR[m] and s˜ ∈ ΣP[m] and s ∼m s˜. Then the following holds:
– For every state s′ ∈ ΣR[m], if s (p,c)/o−−−−→R s′ then there exists a state s˜′ ∈ ΣP[m]
s.t. s˜
(p,c)/o−−−−→P s˜′ and s′ ∼m s˜′, and
– For every state s˜′ ∈ ΣP[m] if sˆ (p,c)/o−−−−→P s˜′ then there exists a state s′ ∈ ΣR[m] s.t.
s
(p,c)/o−−−−→R s′ and s′ ∼m s˜′.
2.5 Locality of Packet-Effect Middlebox Transitions
In this section we present a locality property of the packet effect semantics that will
allow us to efficiently compute an abstract transformer when applying a Cartesian ab-
straction. Namely, we observe that an execution of an operation r(a) :=cond, in the
context of processing an input packet p, potentially updates the packet states of all
packets. However, for each packet p˜, the updated packet state s˜′(p˜) depends only on its
pre-state s˜(p˜), the input channel c, the input packet p, and s˜(p), which determines the
value of queries; it is completely independent of the packet states of all other packets.
Since, in addition, the execution path of the middlebox when processing input packet p
depends only on the packet state of p, this form of locality, which we formalize next,
extends to entire middlebox programs.
Definition 2 (Substate). Let s˜ ∈ P → Q(m) → {True,False} be a packet effect
state. We denote by s˜|{p,p˜} ∈ {p, p˜} → Q(m) → {True,False} the substate obtained
from s˜ by dropping all packet states other than those of p and p˜. Let ΣP[m, p, p˜] def=
{p, p˜} → Q(m)→ {True,False} denote the set of substates for p and p˜.
Definition 3 (Substate transition relation). We define the substate transition relation
(p,c)/(pi,ci)i=1..k−−−−−−−−−−−→P[p,p˜]: ΣP[m, p, p˜]×ΣP[m, p, p˜] as follows. A substate transition
s˜[p, p˜]
(p,c)/(pi,ci)i=1..k−−−−−−−−−−−→P[p,p˜] s˜[p, p˜]′ holds if there exist s˜ and s˜′ such that s˜|[p,p˜] =
s˜[p, p˜], s˜′|[p,p˜] = s˜[p, p˜]′ and s˜ (p,c)/(pi,ci)i=1..k−−−−−−−−−−−→P s˜′.
9The locality of AMDL programs manifests itself in the ability to compute the sub-
state transition relation,
(p,c)/(pi,ci)i=1..k−−−−−−−−−−−→P[p,p˜], directly from the code (without first
computing the transition relation and then using projection). This property will be im-
portant later to efficiently compute a network-level abstract transformer (Sec. 4.1):
Lemma 2 (2-Locality). Given s˜[p, p˜] and s˜[p, p˜]′, checking whether
s˜[p, p˜]
(p,c)/(pi,ci)i=1..k−−−−−−−−−−−→P[p,p˜] s˜[p, p˜]′
can be done in time linear in the size of the middlebox program.
3 Network Semantics
This section defines the semantics of stateful networks by defining the semantics of
packet traversal over communication channels in the network, and the transitions be-
tween network configurations. We first define a concrete semantics, followed by two
relaxations: unordered semantics and reverting semantics. These relaxations provide
sufficient conditions for completeness of the abstract interpretation performed in Sec. 4.
Fig. 12 provides a high-level view of the different network semantics.
Network Topology. A network N is a finite bidirected8 graph of hosts and middleboxes,
equipped with a packet domain. Formally, N = (H ∪M,E,P ), where:
– P is a set of packets.
– H is a finite set of hosts. A host h ∈ H consists of a unique identifier and a set of
packets Ph ⊆ P that it can send.
– M is a finite set of middleboxes. A middlebox m ∈ M is associated with a set of
communication channels Cm.
– E ⊆ {〈h, cm,m〉, 〈m, cm, h〉 | h ∈ H,m ∈M, cm ∈ Cm}∪{〈m1, cm1 , cm2 ,m2〉 |
m1,m2 ∈ M, cm1 ∈ Cm1 , cm2 ∈ Cm2} is the set of directed communication
channels in the network, each connecting a communication channel cm1 ∈ Cm1
of middlebox m1 either to a host, or to a communication channel cm2 ∈ Cm2 of
middlebox m2. For e of the form 〈m, cm, h〉 or 〈m, cm, cm2 ,m2〉, we say that e is
an egress channel of middlebox m connected to channel cm and an ingress channel
of host h, respectively middlebox m2, connected to channel cm2 .
The network semantics is parametric in the middlebox semantics. It considers the
semantics of a middlebox m ∈ M to be a transition system with a finite set of states
Σ[m], an initial state σI(m) ∈ Σ[m] and a set of transitions (p,c)/(pi,ci)i=1..k−−−−−−−−−−−→⊆ Σ[m]×
Σ[m]. This can be realized with either the relation effect semantics or the packet effect
semantics defined in Sec. 2.2 and Sec. 2.3, respectively.
8 A bidirected graph is a directed graph in which every edge has a matching edge in the opposite
direction. i.e., (u, v) ∈ E ⇐⇒ (v, u) ∈ E.
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3.1 Concrete (Ordered) Network Configurations
All variants of the network semantics defined in this section are defined over the same
set of configurations. Let Σ[M ] def=
⋃
m∈M
Σ[m] denote the set of middlebox states of
all middleboxes in a network. An ordered network configuration (σ, pi) ∈ Σ = (M →
Σ[M ]) × (E → P ∗) assigns middleboxes to their (local) middlebox states and com-
munication channels to sequences of packets. The sequence of packets on each channel
represents all packets sent from the source and not yet processed by the destination.
Initial Configuration. We denote the ordered initial configuration by (σI , λ e ∈ E . ),
where σI : M → Σ[M ] denotes the initial state of all middleboxes.
Error Configurations. We say that a configuration is an error configuration if any of
its middleboxes is in the error state. We denote all error configurations by err.
3.2 Concrete (FIFO) Network Semantics
We first consider the First-In-First-Out (FIFO) network semantics, under which com-
munication channels retain the order in which packets were sent.
Ordered Network Transitions. The network semantics is defined via middlebox transi-
tions and host transitions.
A middlebox transition is (σ, pi)
p,e,m
===⇒o (σ′, pi′) where the following holds: (i) p is
the first packet on the channel e ∈ E, (ii) the channel e is an ingress channel of middle-
boxm connected to channel c ∈ Cm, (iii) σ(m) (p,c)/(pi,ci)i=1..k−−−−−−−−−−−→ σ′(m), meaning that
σ′(m) is the result of updating σ(m) according to the middlebox semantics, (iv) the
channels ei are egress channels of middlebox m connected to the channels ci ∈ Cm,
(v) pi′ is the result of removing packet p from (the head of) channel e and appending pi
to the tails of the appropriate channels ei, and (vi) the states of all other middleboxes
equal their states in σ.
A host transition is (σ, pi)
h,e,p
===⇒o (σ, pi′) where one of the following holds:
Packet Production (i) the channel e is an egress channel of host h, (ii) p ∈ Ph is a
packet sent by h, and (iii) pi′ is the result of appending p to the tail of e; or
Packet Consumption (i) the channel e is an ingress channel of host h, (ii) p is the first
packet on the channel e, and (iii) pi′ is the result of removing p from the head of e.
We denote the ordered transition relation obtained by the union of all middlebox
and host transitions by =⇒o. It is naturally lifted to a concrete transformer T o : ℘(Σ)→
℘(Σ) defined as:
T o(X) def= {(σ′, pi′) | (σ, pi) ∈ X ∧ (σ, pi) =⇒o (σ′, pi′)} .
Collecting Semantics. The ordered collecting semantics of a network N is the set of
configurations reachable from the initial configuration.
JNKo def= LeastFixpoint(T o)(σI , λ e ∈ E . ) = ∞⋃
i=1
(T o)i(σI , λ e ∈ E . ) .
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Definition 4 (Safety Verification Problem). For a network N and initial state σI for
the middleboxes, the safety verification problem is to determine whether an error con-
figuration is reachable from the initial configuration. That is, whether err ∈ JNKo.
Theorem 1. [34] The safety verification problem for ordered networks is undecidable.
In this work, we tackle the undecidability of verification by developing a sound
abstract interpretation that can be used to check the safety of networks. Before doing
so, we present two relaxed network semantics that motivate the abstractions we employ,
and also provide sufficient conditions for their completeness.
3.3 Unordered and Reverting Network Semantics
The “unordered” semantics allows channels to not preserve the packet transmission or-
der. Namely, packets in the same channel may be processed in a different order than the
order in which they were received. The “reverting” semantics allows middleboxes to
revert to their initial state after every transition. Formally, these relaxed semantics ex-
tend the set of network transitions (and consequently, the transformer and the collecting
semantics) with reordering transitions and reverting transitions, respectively.
A reordering transition has the form (σ, pi) e=⇒ (σ, pi′) where for the channel e ∈ E,
pi′(e) is a permutation of pi(e) and for all other channels e′ 6= e, pi′(e′) = pi(e′).
A reverting transition has the form (σ, pi) m=⇒ (σ′, pi) where for the middlebox
m ∈M , σ′(m) = σI(m) and for all other middleboxes m′ 6= m, σ′(m) = σ(m).
The unordered network transitions consist of the ordered transitions as well as the
reordering transitions; the ordered reverting transitions consist of the ordered transi-
tions and the reverting transitions; and the unordered reverting transitions consist of all
of the above. We denote the corresponding collecting semantics by JNKu, JNKor andJNKur, respectively. Clearly,
JNKo ⊆ JNKu ⊆ JNKur and JNKo ⊆ JNKor ⊆ JNKur
By plugging-in the two representations of middleboxes in the definition of the net-
work semantics, we obtain two variants of the network semantics for each of the four
variants considered so far. In the sequel, we use a pa subscript to refer to the packet
effect semantics, and no subscript to refer to the relation effect semantics. The bisim-
ulation between middlebox representations is lifted to a bisimulation between each re-
lation state network semantics and the corresponding packet state network semantics.
Therefore, the following holds:
Lemma 3. For every semantic identifier i ∈ {o, u, or, ur}, err ∈ JNKi iff err ∈ JNKipa.
The safety verification problem is adapted for the different variants of the network
semantics. The following theorem summarizes the complexity of the obtained prob-
lems. (We do not distinguish the packet effect semantics from the relation effect seman-
tics, since due to Lem. 3 they induce the same safety verification problem.)
Theorem 2. The safety verification problem is
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(i) EXPSACE-complete for unordered networks [34].
(ii) undecidable for ordered reverting networks (App. B).
(iii) coNP-hard for unordered reverting networks (App. B).
Thm. 2(ii) justifies the need for the unordered abstraction even in reverting net-
works. Thm. 2(iii) implies that our abstract interpretation algorithm, presented in Sec. 4,
which is both sound and complete for the unordered reverting semantics, is essentially
optimal since it essentially meets the lower bound stated in the theorem (it is exponen-
tial in the number of state queries of any middlebox and polynomial in the number of
middleboxes, hosts and packets).
Sticky Properties. Unordered reverting networks have a useful property of sticky pack-
ets, meaning that if a packet is pending for a middlebox in some run of the network then
any run has an extension in which the packet is pending again with multiplicity > n,
for any n ∈ N. This property implies a stronger property:
Lemma 4 (Sticky Packet States Property). For every channel e, packets p, p˜, mid-
dlebox m and packet state v˜ of p˜ in m: If, in some reachable configuration, channel e
contains p and in some (possibly other) reachable configuration the packet state of p˜ in
m is v˜, then there exists a reachable configuration where simultaneously e contains p
and the packet state of p˜ in m is v˜.
Intuitively, Lem. 4 follows from the fact that all middleboxes can revert to their ini-
tial state and the unordered semantics enables a scenario where the particular state and
packets are reconstructed. It ensures that ignoring the correlation between the packet
states of a middlebox for different packets, the packet states across different middle-
boxes, and the occurrence (and cardinality) of packets on channels does not incur any
precision loss w.r.t. safety. This makes the network-level abstraction defined in Sec. 4,
which treats channels as sets of packets and ignores correlations between packet states
and channels, precise.
4 Abstract Interpretation for Stateful Networks
In this section, we present our algorithm for safety verification of stateful networks
based on abstract interpretation of the semantics JNKopa, and discuss its guarantees.
4.1 Abstract Interpretation for Packet Space
We apply sound abstractions to different components of the concrete packet state net-
work domain. Due to space constraints, we do not describe the intermediate steps
in the construction of the abstract domain, and only present the final domain used by
the analysis. Roughly speaking, the obtained domain abstracts away (i) the order and
cardinality of packets on channels; (ii) the correlation between the states of different
middleboxes and different channel contents; and (iii) the correlation between states of
different packets within each middlebox.
Cartesian Packet Effect Abstract Domain. Let Q → {T, F} denote the union of
Q(m) → {T, F} over all middleboxes m ∈ M , including the error state err. The
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Cartesian abstract domain of the packet state of the network is given by the lattice
A def= (A,⊥,v,unionsq), where A def= (M → P → ℘(Q → {T, F})) × (E → ℘(P )).
That is, an abstract element maps each packet in each middlebox to a set of possi-
ble valuations for the queries, and each channel to a set of packets. The bottom ele-
ment is ⊥ def= (λm. λp. ∅, λe. ∅), the partial order a1 v a2 is defined by pointwise
set inclusions per middlebox and channel, and join is defined by pointwise unions
(ω1, ω2) unionsq (ω′1, ω′2) def= (λm. λp. ω1(m)(p) ∪ ω′1(m)(p), λe. ω2(p) ∪ ω′2(p)).
Let C def= (℘(ΣP),⊆) be the concrete network domain. We define the Galois con-
nection (C, γ, α,A) as follows. The abstraction function α : ℘(ΣP) → A for a set of
packet state configurations X ⊆ ΣP is defined as α(X) = (ωmboxes, ωchans) where
ωmboxes = λm. λp. {σ(m)(p) | (σ, pi) ∈ X} and ωchans = λe.
⋃
(σ,pi)∈X
pi(e) .
The concretization function γ : A→ ℘(ΣP) is induced by α and v. We denote the
initial abstract element as aI = α({(σI , λ e ∈ E . ∅)}).
Abstract Transformer. Next, we define the abstract transformer T ] : A → A, which
soundly abstracts the concrete transformer T o and show that it is efficient, due to the
locality property of middlebox transitions. We use the predicate in(c, e,m) to denote
that the network channel e is an ingress channel of middlebox m, connected to its c
channel. Similarly, out(c, e,m) means that e is an egress channel of m connected to its
c channel. Further, let [x1 7→y1, . . . , xn 7→yn] denote a mapping from each xi to yi for
i = 1..n and f [x 7→ y] denote the function f updated by (re-)mapping x to y.
Definition 5. Let (ω1, ω2) ∈ (M → P → ℘(Q → {T, F})) × (E → ℘(P )) be an
abstract element. Then T ](ω1, ω2) def=
⊔

(ω1[m7→p˜s],
ω2[ei 7→ω2(ei) ∪ {pi}])
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1) m ∈M,
(2) p ∈ ω2(e), in(c, e,m),
(3) s˜ ∈ ω1(m), p˜ ∈ P,
s˜[p, p˜] = [p 7→ s˜(p), p˜ 7→ s˜(p˜)],
(4) s˜[p, p˜]
(p,c)/(pi,ci)i=1..k−−−−−−−−−−−→P[p,p˜] s˜[p, p˜]′,
(5) p˜s = s˜[p˜7→{ s˜[p, p˜]′(p˜) }],
(6) out(ci, ei,m), i = 1..k

.
Intuitively, the transformer updates the abstract state by joining the individual ef-
fects obtained by: (1) considering each middlebox, (2) considering each input packet to
the middlebox, (3) considering every possible substate for the input packet p and every
other packet p˜, (4) considering every possible substate transition, (5) adding the new
packet state for p˜ to the relevant set, and (6) adding each output packet to the corre-
sponding edge.
Proposition 1. The running time of T ] isO((|M |+ |E|) · |P |2 ·22|Qmax|), whereQmax
denotes the maximal set of queries Q(m) over all middleboxes m ∈M .
Our algorithm for safety verification computes µ] def= LeastFixpoint(T ])(aI) =∞⊔
i=1
T ]i(aI) and checks whether err ∈ µ].
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Complexity of Least Fixpoint Computation. The height of the abstract domain lattice is
determined by the number of packets that can be added to the channels of the network—
(|P | · |E|), multiplied by the number of state changes that can occur in any of the
middleboxes—O(|M | · |P | · 2|Q|). The time complexity of the abstract interpretation is
bounded by the height of the abstract domain lattice multiplied by the time complexity
of the abstract transformer:
O(|P |4 · |E| · |M | · 23|Qmax| · (|M |+ |E|)) .
4.2 Soundness and Completeness
Our algorithm is sound in the sense that it never misses an error state. This follows from
the use of a sound abstract interpretation:
Theorem 3 (Soundness). JNKopa ⊆ JNKurpa ⊆ γ(µ]).
Our algorithm is also complete relative to the reverting unordered semantics.
Theorem 4 (Completeness). µ] v α(JNKurpa).
The proof of Thm. 4 relies on the sticky property formalized by Lem. 4. The theorem
states that for reverting unordered networks µ] is at least as precise as applying the
abstraction function on the concrete packet state network semantics. In particular, this
implies that if µ] is an abstract error element then err ∈ JNKurpa. As a result, for such
networks our algorithm is a decision procedure. For other networks it may produce false
alarms, if safety is not maintained by an unordered reverting abstraction.
Properties. Recall that we express safety properties via middleboxes in the network.
Therefore, in unordered reverting networks, the possibility to revert applies to the safety
property as well, and may introduce false alarms due to addition of behaviors leading to
error. However, for safety properties such as isolation which are suffix-closed (i.e., all
the suffixes of a safe run are themselves safe runs), this cannot happen (Appendix A).
5 Implementation and Initial Evaluation
In this section, we describe our implementation of the analysis described in Sec. 4, and
report our initial experience running the algorithm on a few example networks.
Implementation. We have developed a compiler, amdlc, which takes as input a net-
work topology and its initial state (given in json format) and AMDL programs for
the middleboxes that appear in the topology. The compiler outputs a Datalog program,
which can then be efficiently solved by a Datalog solver. Specifically, we use Log-
icBlox [2].
The generated Datalog programs include three relations: (i) packetsSeen, which
stores the packets sent over the network channels; (ii) middleboxState, which
stores the packet state of individual packets in each middlebox (i.e., the possible valua-
tion of each middlebox program’s queries for each individual packet); and (iii) abort,
which stores the middleboxes that have reached an err state.
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Fig. 4: Topology of the datacenter example.
We encode the packets that hosts can send to their neighboring middleboxes and the
initial state of the middleboxes as Datalog facts (edb), and the effects of the middlebox
programs, i.e. relation update actions and packet output actions, as Datalog rules (idb).
We then use the datalog engine to compute the fixed point of the datalog pro-
gram. That fixed point is exactly the least fixed point µ] def= LeastFixpoint(T ])(aI) =∞⊔
i=1
T ]i(aI)
Evaluation. The main challenge in acquiring realistic benchmarks is that middlebox
configuration and network topology are considered security sensitive, and as a result
enterprises and network operators do not release this information to the public. Con-
sequently, we benchmarked our tool using the synthetic topologies and configurations
described by [23].
Our benchmarks focus on datacenter networks and enterprise networks. The set of
middleboxes we used in our datacenter benchmarks is based on information provided
in [26], and on conversations with datacenter providers. We ran both a simple case
where each tenant machine is protected by firewalls and an IPS (Intrusion Prevention
System); and a more complex case where we use redundant servers and distribute traffic
across them using a load balancer. Our enterprise topology is based on the standard
topology used in a variety of university departments including UIUC (reported in [17]),
UC Berkeley, Stanford, etc. which employ firewalls and an IP gateway.
We ran two scaling experiments, measuring how well our system scales when the
number of hosts or the number of middleboxes in the network increases The experi-
ments were run on Amazon EC2 r4.16 instances with 64-core CPUs and 488GiB RAM.
Multi Tenant Datacenter Network. Fig. 4 illustrates the topology of a multi tenant dat-
acenter. Each rack hosts a different tenant, and the safety property we wish to verify is
isolation between the hosts of the two racks. In this example the network also employs
an IPS to prevent malicious traffic from reaching the datacenter. Actual IPS code is
too complex to be accurately modeled in AMDL; instead we over-approximate the be-
haviour of an IPS by modeling it as a process that non-deterministically drops incoming
packets.
Enterprise Network. Fig. 5a illustrates the topology of an enterprise network. The en-
terprise network consists of three subnets, each with a different security policy. The
public subnet is allowed unrestricted access with the outside network. The quarantined
subnet is not allowed any communication with the outside network. The private subnet
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(a) Enterprise (b) Running time (seconds).
Fig. 5: Topology and running times of the host scalability test.
can initiate communication with a host in the outside network, but hosts in the outside
network cannot initiate communication with the hosts in the private subnet.
To evaluate the feasibility of our solution, we ran the analysis of Fig. 5a on net-
works with varying numbers of hosts ranging from 20 to 2,000. Our implementation
successfully verified a network with 2,000 hosts in under four hours, suggesting that
the implementation could be used to verify realistic networks. Fig. 5b shows the times
of the analysis on an enterprise network with 20–2,000 hosts.
Datacenter Middlebox Pipeline. Fig. 6a describes a datacenter topology with a pipeline
of middleboxes connecting servers to the Internet. The topology contains multiple mid-
dlebox pipelines for load-balancing purposes and to ensure resiliency. We use this topol-
ogy to test the scalability of our approach w.r.t the size of the network, by adding addi-
tional middlebox pipelines and keeping the number of hosts constant.
Fig. 6b shows the running times of the analysis of a datacenter with 3–189 middle-
boxes (1–32 middlebox chains). All topologies contained 1000 hosts.
(a) Topology with multiple middlebox-
pipelines
(b) Running time (seconds).
Fig. 6: Topology and running times of the network topology scalability test.
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6 Concluding Remarks and Related Work
In this paper, we applied abstract interpretation for efficient verification of networks
with stateful nodes. We now briefly survey closely related works in this area.
Topology Independent Network Verification. Early work in network verification fo-
cused on proving correctness of network protocols [5,27]. Subsequent work in the
context of software define networking (SDN) including Flowlog [22] and VeriCon [3]
looked at verifying the correctness of network applications (implemented as middle-
boxes or in network controllers) independent of the topology and configuration of the
network where these were used. However, since this problem is undecidable, these
methods use bounded model checking or user provided inductive invariants, which are
hard to specify even in simple network topologies.
Verifying Immutable Network Configurations. Verifying networks with immutable
states is an active line of research [17,13,15,4,14,32,29,1,11]. In the future, we hope
to combine our abstraction with the techniques used in these papers. We hope to use
similar techniques to Veriflow [15] to handle switches more efficiently, and leverage
compact header representation described in NetKat [11].
Stateful Network Verification. Previous works provide useful tools for detecting errors
in firewalls [19,18,21]. Buzz [8] and SymNet [33] have looked at how to use sym-
bolic execution and packet generation for testing and verifying the behavior of stateful
networks. These works implement testing techniques rather than verifying network be-
havior and are hence complementary to our approach.
Velner et al. [34] show that checking safety in stateful networks is undecidable, ne-
cessitating the use of overapproximations. They provide a general algorithm for check-
ing safety using Petri nets. This algorithm has high complexity and scales poorly. They
also provide an efficient algorithm for checking safety in a limited class of networks.
Exploring Network Symmetry. Recent work explored the use of bisimulation to lever-
age the extensive symmetry found in real network topologies [20] to accelerate state-
less [24] and stateful [23] network verification. Both approaches are not automatic. We
are encouraged by the fact that our automatic approach achieves performance compa-
rable to VMN [23] on the same examples without requiring human intervention. We
attribute this improvement to modularity and to the use of packet state representation.
Extensible Semantics. Previous works have explored ideas similar to the reverting se-
mantics, to obtain complexity and decidability results in different settings.
In [7] the authors analyze the complexity of verifying asynchronous shared-memory
systems. They use copycat processes that mirror the behaviour of another process to
show that executions are extensible, similarly to how our work uses the sticky packet
states property (Lem. 4). In their model, when the processes are finite state machines,
they obtain coNP-complete complexity for verification.
In [9] the authors explore a more general setting of well-structured transition sys-
tem, and present the home-state idea, which allows the system to return to its initial
state (essentially, revert). They obtain decidability results for well-structured transition
systems with a home-state, but do not show any tighter complexity results.
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A Reverting Safety Properties
Recall that we express safety properties via middleboxes in the network. Therefore, in
unordered reverting networks, the possibility to revert applies to the safety property as
well. As the reverting semantics adds transitions, this may increase the possible set of
transitions of the safety middleboxes, and, in particular, may add transitions into an
error state. For some temporal safety properties this is a source of imprecision as they
cannot be precisely captured by the reverting semantics, thus introducing false alarms.
For example, if the safety property forbids a packet from host hext to host hin before
a packet from host hin has been sent to hext, then in a reverting network, even if a packet
from host hin has been previously sent to hext, a revert transition allows the middlebox
to return to its initial state, from which a packet from host hext to host hin leads to an
error state.
However, we identify a class of safety middleboxes that is guaranteed not to be a
source of imprecision. This class includes any stateless safety middlebox, and in par-
ticular isolation middleboxes, More generally, we provide a sufficient condition for a
safety property to be precisely expressible in a reverting network. To do so, we first de-
couple the enforcement of safety from the forwarding behavior of the network. For this
decoupling, in the sequel we consider safety middleboxes with a single output port that
forward any incoming packet (on any input port) to the output port without any modi-
fication. This ensures that safety middleboxes do not affect the forwarding behavior of
the network. In particular, the forwarding behavior of safety middleboxes does not de-
pend on their state. The state is only used to enforce safety. For such safety middleboxes
we define:
Definition 6. A safety middleboxm is revert-robust if for every sequence of input pack-
ets in = (pi, ci)i=1..k, if no execution of m on in, starting from m’s initial state, leads
to err, then for every suffix in′ of in, no execution of m on in′ starting from m’s initial
state leads to err as well.
Intuitively, revert-robustness means that the language of “safe” sequences of packets
is suffix-closed. In particular, any stateless safety middlebox (such as an isolation mid-
dleboxes) is revert-robust. For example, if the safety middlebox forbids a packet from
host hext to host hin after a packet from host hin has been sent to hext, then it is revert-
robust. The reason is that, in this example, the “safe” input sequences are ones where no
packet from host hext to host hin has a preceding packet from host hin to hext. Therefore
any suffix of a safe input sequence is also safe. As a result, such a safety middlebox
will not introduce false alarms in a reverting network, as reverting transitions will just
make the middlebox “forget” the prefix of the sequence. (Note that it will also not make
the network wrongfully safe, as safety requires that all executions, including the ones
that do not use revert transitions, are safe.) Next, we claim that revert-robustness is a
sufficient condition for not losing precision of the analysis (i.e., not introducing false
alarms) due to the revert transitions of the safety middlebox. In order to formalize this
claim, we need the following definitions. For a network N with a set of middleboxes
M , a subset S ⊆ M , and a semantic identifier i ∈ {o, u, or, ur}, we denote by JNKi\Spa
the corresponding network collecting semantics, with the exception that no reverting
transitions are applied to the middleboxes in S (when applicable). We then have:
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Lemma 5. Let N be a network such that all of its safety middleboxes, S ⊆ M , are
revert-robust. Then for every i ∈ {o, u, or, ur}, err ∈ JNKi\Spa if and only if err ∈ JNKipa,
where JNKi\Spa is the same as JNKipa, except that no reverting transitions are applied to
the middleboxes in S.
This means that the network is safe (under any of the semantics) if and only if it is safe
with the same semantics except that all safety middleboxes are non-reverting.
Proof. The direction from left to right is trivial, as the reverting semantics is a sound
approximation, hence a computation leading to error when S is non-reverting also exists
when S is reverting. In order to prove the converse direction we denote byN the network
where all middleboxes including S may revert and by N′ the network where S may not
revert. We prove that if all the computations of N′ are safe then so are the computations
of N. The proof is straightforward. We observe that for every scenario s in N there is a
corresponding scenario inN′ which is identical to s other than the behavior of the safety
middleboxes (this is because safety middleboxes do not affect forwarding of packets).
Consider a safety middlebox m and an arbitrary step i in the scenario. Let p1, . . . , p` be
the sequence of packets that m processed until step i and let pr, . . . , p` be the packets it
processed since it was last reverted. Since N′ is safe, it follows that in N′ the middlebox
m is not in err. As m is revert-robust and pr, . . . , p` is a suffix of p1, . . . , p`, then m is
also not in err state in N. Thus, we get that for every s, i and m, the middlebox m is not
in err state. Hence, N is safe and the proof is complete.
B Proofs
In this section, we include proofs for some of the key claims made in the paper.
Proof (Proof of Thm. 2 (Undecidability)). It is well known that an automaton with an
ordered channel of messages (also known as a channel machine) can simulate a Turing
machine. The channel can trivially store the content of a Turing machine tape, and
the automaton can simulate the transitions of the machine. This can be used to easily
show that in the absence of reverting the isolation problem over ordered channels is
undecidable even when there is only one host, and one middlebox with a self loop.
When reverting is possible, we add auxiliary packet type and middlebox states.
Whenever in initial state, the middlebox sends a special packet over its self loop, and
discards all arrived packets until it receives the special packet 9. This empties the self
loop from its content, which intuitively, resets the tape of the Turing machine. Hence,
when the middlebox reverts, so does the Turing machine. Thus, the isolation property
is violated if and only if the Turing machine reaches an accepting state, and the unde-
cidability proof follows.
Proof (Proof of Thm. 2 (coNP-hardness)). We prove that if the number of queries in a
middlebox is not a constant (i.e., it depends on other parameters of the problem), then
the safety problem is coNP- hard even when the network consists of only one middlebox
9 Note that for this step it is crucial that the channels are FIFO.
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and one host. The proof is by reduction from the Boolean unsatisfiability problem of
propositional formulas.
Given a formula φwith n variables x1, . . . , xn we construct a network with one host
and one middlebox m, such that m has only one port, connected to h. The packet types
are x1,¬x1, . . . , xn,¬xn, i.e., there are 2n packet types, one for each literal. The mid-
dlebox has two nullary relations, Oi and Vi, for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, where intuitively,
Oi indicates whether a packet of type xi or ¬xi already occurred and Vi indicates if
the first such packet is positive (xi) or negative (¬xi). That is, the Oi relations indicate
which variables are assigned, while the Vi relations store the assignment. Initially all the
relations are initialized to False (i.e., no variable is assigned). Upon receiving a packet
of type xi or ¬xi, the middlebox updates the relation Vi only if Oi is False, in which
case Oi is also updated to True. If the packet type is xi, then Vi is updated to True.
Otherwise it is updated to False. In addition, whenever the interpretation of Oi and Vi
satisfies φ, the middlebox aborts. Clearly, the size of the code of m is polynomial and
safety is violated if and only if φ is satisfiable. We note that possible resets do not affect
the safety of the network.
Lemma 6 (Sticky Packets Property). For every channel e and packet p: If in some
reachable configuration e contains p, then every run can be extended such that e will
eventually contain p. Moreover, every run can be extended such that e will eventually
contain n copies of p (for every n > 0).
Proof (Proof of Lem. 6). The proof relies on the reverting property and on the fact that
the channels are unordered.
Let σ0 be a reachable configuration in which p occurs in e, and let s0 be the scenario
that led to it, i.e., the sequence of events that took place. Consider an arbitrary run
(scenario) pi. One can extend pi with the following scenario: First all the middleboxes
return to their initial state. Second, scenario s0 occur, i.e., only packets from scenario
s0 are processed, and the other packets are ignored. This extension is possible because
the channels are unordered.
To construct a scenario in which e contains n copies of p, we just concatenate the
above mentioned extension n time.
Lemma 7 (Sticky States Property). For every channel e, packet p, middlebox m and
state s of m: If, in some reachable configuration, channel e contains p and in some
(possibly other) reachable configuration m is in state s, then there exists a reachable
configuration where simultaneously e contains p and m is in state s.
Proof (Proof of Lem. 7). Let (p1, . . . , p`) be the sequence of packets that m processed
from the latest reset until it arrives to state σm in the given witness scenario.
Consider an arbitrary run. By Lem. 6 we can extend this run such that p1, . . . , p` are
pending packets in the ingress channel of middlebox m and p is pending in e (if some
of the packets occur more than once in the sequence, then by the same lemma we may
assume that there are multiple copies of those packets).
We further extend the run with a reset event for middlebox m. Finally, we extend
the scenario such that in the next ` steps m will process p1, . . . , p` reaching state σm.
Proof (Proof of Lem. 4). The proof follows directly from Lem. 1, 6 and 7.
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Proof (Proof of Thm. 4). In order to prove completeness it is enough to show that every
application of the best abstract transformer results in an abstract value that is less or
equal than the result of applying the abstraction function on the concrete least fixed
point (i.e., the reachable states of the network w.r.t unordered reverting packet state
space semantic). The proof is by induction over n, the number of times we apply the
transformer. The proof for n = 0 is trivial. For n > 1, let p, p˜ and m be packets and a
middlebox. By the induction hypothesis for every packet state v ∈ ω1(m)(p˜) there is
a concrete reachable middlebox state such that the state of m over packet p˜ is v′ and
for every packet p ∈ ω′2(e) there is a reachable concrete configuration where p is in e.
Hence, by Lem. 4, there exists a concrete reachable configuration in which p is in e and
the state of m over packet p˜ is v. Therefore, by definition of ω′1 and ω
′
2, every new state
in ω′1(m)(p˜) \ω1(m)(p˜) has a corresponding concrete reachable state, and likewise for
any new pending packet in ω′2(e) \ ω(2). The proof is complete.
Proof (proof of Lem. 5). The direction from left to right is trivial, as the reverting se-
mantics is a sound approximation, hence a computation leading to error when S is non-
reverting also exists when S is reverting. In order to prove the converse direction we
assume that err 6∈ JNKi\Spa and prove that all the computations of JNKipa are safe. The
proof is straightforward. We observe that for every computation s in JNKipa there is a
corresponding computation in JNKi\Spa which is identical to s other than the behavior of
the safety middleboxes (this is because safety middleboxes do not affect forwarding of
packets). Consider a safety middleboxm and an arbitrary step k in the computation. Let
p1, . . . , p` be the sequence of packets that m processed until step i and let pr, . . . , p`
be the packets it processed since it last reverted. Since err 6∈ JNKi\Spa it follows that in
particular the middlebox m is not in err state. As m is revert-robust and pr, . . . , p` is
a suffix of p1, . . . , p`, then m is also not in err state in JNKipa (where it may revert).
Thus, we get that for every s, k and m, the middlebox m is not in err state. Hence,
err 6∈ JNKipa and the proof is completed.
C The Semantics of AMDL
In this section, we define two semantics for middleboxes—the one based on relation
states and the one based packet states. We then prove that both semantics are bisimilar.
A Note on Field Binding.. A pblock construct binds the atoms in a packet received
on a channel to field names before executing a guarded commands. We will assume
that there is at most one pblock construct per incoming channel. This assumption does
not impose a restriction, since two pblock constructs ch ? (f1, . . . , fk) ⇒ gc1 and
ch ? (g1, . . . , gk) ⇒ gc2 over the same channel ch can be automatically merged into a
single pblock construct via the source-to-source transformation
ch ? (f1, . . . , fk) ⇒ if gc1gc2[f1/g1, . . . , fk/gk] fi
where the field names of the second pblock construct are substituted appropriately for
the field names of the first pblock construct. (Technically, the transformation first ex-
tends the sequence of atoms of the pblock construct with fewer number of atoms by
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adding dummy atoms.) This assumption allows us to access the atom ai of the incom-
ing packet by indexing into the sequence of fields, as fi.
C.1 Relation State Semantics
We start by defining a big-step semantics for relation states.
Let m be a fixed middlebox.
For simplicity of the presentation, we consider the case where P def= (H ×H × T )
denotes the set of all packets. (The adaptation to other definitions of the packets space
is straightforward.) Let Cm denote the set of channels of m. We define the sequence
of pairs of packets and channels to be sent following a transition of the middlebox
m on every channel as Cont def= (P × Cm)∗. The semantics of guarded commands,
actions, conditions, and atoms is given in the context of a middlebox state s ∈ Σ[m] =
rels(m)→ ℘(D(m)) and a packet p.
We start by defining in Fig. 7 semantic evaluation functions for atoms and condi-
tions:
R[[·]] : 〈atom〉 → P → (T ∪H)
R[[·]] : 〈cond〉 → (Σ[m]× P )→ {True,False}
R[[fi]]p
def
= ai p = (a1, . . . , ak)
R[[(fj1 , . . . , fjk )]]p
def
= (aj1 , . . . , ajk ) p = (a1, . . . , ak)
R[[h]]p def= h h ∈ H
R[[t]]p def= t t ∈ T
R[[true]](s, p) def= True
R[[false]](s, p) def= False
R[[c1 and c2]](s, p)
def
=
{
True, R[[c1]](s, p) = True and R[[c2]](s, p) = True;
False, otherwise.
R[[not c]](s, p) def=
{
False, R[[c]](s, p) = True;
True, otherwise.
R[[a1 = a2]](s, p)
def
=
{
True, R[[a1]]p = R[[a2]]p;
False, otherwise.
R[[a in r]](s, p) def=

False, s = err;
True, R[[a]]p ∈ s(r);
False, otherwise.
Fig. 7: Semantic evaluation of atoms and conditions.
Fig. 8 defines transition relations for guarded commands, blocks, and middleboxes:
R[[·]] : 〈action〉 → (Σ[m]× P × Cont)× (Σ[m]× P × Cont)
R[[·]] : 〈gc〉 → (Σ[m]× P × Cont)× (Σ[m]× P × Cont)
R[[·]] : 〈pblock〉 → (Σ[m]× (P × Cm))× (Σ[m]× Cont)
R[[·]] : 〈mbox〉 → (Σ[m]× (P × Cm))× (Σ[m]× Cont) .
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A guarded command accepts a middlebox state, an assignment of fields to values,
and a mapping from output channels to their output content (i.e., the sequences of pack-
ets that should be delivered to them). It returns the updated state, the (same) assignment
of fields to values, and the new mapping from channels to content.
A block accepts a middlebox state and a packet on a specified input channel and
returns the updated state and the output sent to the output channels. A middlebox non-
deterministically chooses between its blocks.
〈ch ! a, (s, p, send)〉 −→R (s, p, send) s = err
〈ch ! a, (s, p, send)〉 −→R (s, p, send · (R[[a]]p, ch)) s 6= err
〈r(a) := c, (s, p, send)〉 −→R (s, p, send) s = err
〈r(a) := c, (s, p, send)〉 −→R (s[r 7→ s(r) ∪ {R[[a]]p}], p, send) R[[c]](s, p) = True
〈r(a) := c, (s, p, send)〉 −→R (s[r 7→ s(r) \ {R[[a]]p}], p, send) R[[c]](s, p) = False
〈abort, (s, p, send)〉 −→R (err, p, send)
〈ac1, (s, p, send)〉 −→R (s′, p, send′) 〈ac2, (s′, p, send′)〉 −→R (s′′, p, send′′)
〈ac1; ac2, (s, p, send)〉 −→R (s′′, p, send′′)
〈c⇒ ac, (s, p, send)〉 −→R R[[ac]](s, p, send) if R[[c]](s, p) = True
〈c⇒ ac, (s, p, send)〉 −→R (s, p, send) if s = err
〈gi, (s, p, send)〉 −→R (s′, p, send′)
〈if g1 . . .gn fi, (s, p, send)〉 −→R (s′, p, send′)
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
〈g, (s, p, ∅)〉 −→R (s′, p, send)
〈ch ? (f1, . . . , fk) ⇒ g, (s, (p, ch)))〉 −→R (s′, send)
p = (a1, . . . , ak)
〈pj , (s, (p, ch))〉 −→R (s′, send)
〈m = do p1 . . .pn od, (s, (p, ch))〉 −→R (s′, send)
j ∈ {1, . . . , n}
Fig. 8: Derivation rules for atomic actions, guarded commands, blocks, and middle-
boxes.
C.2 Packet State Semantics
The packet state semantics is defined via the evaluation functions
P[[·]] : 〈atom〉 → P → (T ∪H)
P[[·]] : 〈cond〉 → (ΣP[m]× P )→ {True,False}
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and the transition relations
P[[·]] : 〈action〉 → (ΣP[m]× P × Cont)× (ΣP[m]× P × Cont)
P[[·]] : 〈gc〉 → (ΣP[m]× P × Cont)× (ΣP[m]× P × Cont)
P[[·]] : 〈pblock〉 → (ΣP[m]× (P × Cm))× (ΣP[m]× Cont)
P[[·]] : 〈mbox〉 → (ΣP[m]× (P × Cm))× (ΣP[m]× Cont) .
We define the helper function
update : (ΣP[m]× rels(m)× atoms∗ × {True,False})→ ΣP[m] ,
which updates a given packet state by adding or removing a given tuple from a given
relation, depending on the Boolean value b.
update(s, r, a, b) def=
λp˜ ∈ P. λq ∈ Q(m).

b, if rel(q) = r ∧
atoms(q)(p˜) = a(p).
s˜(p˜)(q), otherwise.
Fig. 9 shows the evaluation of queries and the derivation rules for updating relations.
The rest of the evaluation functions and derivation rules have the same shape as those
in Fig. 7 and Fig. 8, replacing −→R with −→P and R[[·]] with P[[·]].
P[[a in r]](s, p) def=
{
False, s = err;
s(p)(a in r), otherwise.
〈r(a) := c, (s, p, send)〉 −→P (s, p, send) s = err
〈r(a) := c, (s, p, send)〉 −→P (update(s, r, a, b), p, send) b = P[[c]](s, p)
Fig. 9: Query evaluation and relation update derivation rule for the packet state seman-
tics.
C.3 Proving Lem. 1
To prove bisimulation, we use induction on the derivation trees. Since the shape of all
rules, except the ones shown in Fig. 9, is exactly the same, we only need to demonstrate
bisimilarity for them.
Notice that the semantics is strict in err—the derivation rules for err propagate err
and query evaluations return False. We therefore, focus only on the cases where the
states are different from err.
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ps(s[r 7→ s(r) ∪ {R[[a]]p}])
= λp˜ ∈ P. λq ∈ Q(m). atoms(q)(p˜) ∈ s[r 7→ s(r) ∪ {R[[a]]p}](rel(q))
= λp˜ ∈ P. λq ∈ Q(m). atoms(q)(p˜) ∈
{ {R[[a]]p}, rel(q) = r;
s(rel(q)), otherwise.
= λp˜ ∈ P. λq ∈ Q(m).
{
atoms(q)(p˜) ∈ {R[[a]]p}, rel(q) = r;
atoms(q)(p˜) ∈ s(rel(q)), otherwise.
= λp˜ ∈ P. λq ∈ Q(m).
{
atoms(q)(p˜) = R[[a]]p, rel(q) = r;
atoms(q)(p˜) ∈ s(rel(q)), otherwise.
= λp˜ ∈ P. λq ∈ Q(m).
{
True, rel(q) = r ∧ atoms(q)(p˜) = a(p);
atoms(q)(p˜) ∈ s(rel(q)), otherwise.
= λp˜ ∈ P. λq ∈ Q(m).
{
True, rel(q) = r ∧ atoms(q)(p˜) = a(p);
s˜(p˜)(q), otherwise. (using 1)
= update(s˜, r, a,True)
Fig. 10: Detailed proof steps.
Bisimilarity of Query Evaluation
Lemma 8. If s˜ ∼m s and s 6= err then the following holds:
P[[a in r]](s˜, p) = R[[a in r]](s, p) .
Proof. Recall that s˜ ∼m s is defined as:
s˜ = λp˜ ∈ P. λq ∈ Q(m). atoms(q)(p˜) ∈ s(rel(q)) .
Assume p = (a1, . . . , ak) and a = (f1, . . . , fk).
Then the following holds:
P[[a in r]](s˜, p)
= s˜(p)(a in r)
= (λp˜ ∈ P. λq ∈ Q(m). atoms(q)(p˜) ∈ s(rel(q)))(p)(a in r)
= (λq ∈ Q(m). atoms(q)(p) ∈ s(rel(q)))(a in r)
= (a1, . . . , ak) ∈ s(r)
= R[[(f1, . . . , fk)]]p ∈ s(r)
= R[[a in r]](s, p) .
Bisimilarity of Relation Updates Assume that s˜ ∼m s and that s 6= err. By the
induction hypothesis, we have that b = P[[c]](s˜, p) = R[[c]](s, p) holds.
Assume that b = True. Therefore, the following derivations apply:
〈r(a) := c, (s, p, send)〉 −→R (s[r 7→ s(r) ∪ {R[[a]]p}], p, send)
〈r(a) := c, (s˜, p, send)〉 −→P (update(s˜, r, a,True), p, send) .
We will use the following identity, which we obtain from the definition of s˜:
s˜(p)(q)
= (λp˜ ∈ P. λq˜ ∈ Q(m). atoms(q˜)(p˜) ∈ s(rel(q˜)))(p)(q)
= atoms(q)(p) ∈ s(rel(q)) .
(1)
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ps(s[r 7→ s(r) \ {R[[a]]p}])
= λp˜ ∈ P. λq ∈ Q(m). atoms(q)(p˜) ∈ s[r 7→ s(r) \ {R[[a]]p}](rel(q))
= λp˜ ∈ P. λq ∈ Q(m).
{
atoms(q)(p˜) 6∈ {R[[a]]p}, rel(q) = r;
atoms(q)(p˜) ∈ s(rel(q)), otherwise.
= λp˜ ∈ P. λq ∈ Q(m).
{
atoms(q)(p˜) 6= R[[a]]p, rel(q) = r;
atoms(q)(p˜) ∈ s(rel(q)), otherwise.
= λp˜ ∈ P. λq ∈ Q(m).
{
False, rel(q) = r ∧ atoms(q)(p˜) = a(p);
atoms(q)(p˜) ∈ s(rel(q)), otherwise.
= λp˜ ∈ P. λq ∈ Q(m).
{
False, rel(q) = r ∧ atoms(q)(p˜) = a(p);
s˜(p˜)(q), otherwise. (using 1)
= update(s˜, r, a,False)
Fig. 11: Detailed proof steps.
We have to show that the following relation holds in Fig. 10:
s[r 7→ s(r) ∪ {R[[a]]p}] ∼m update(s˜, r, a,True) .
Assume that b = False. Therefore, the following derivations apply:
〈r(a) := c, (s, p, send)〉 −→R (s[r 7→ s(r) \ {R[[a]]p}], p, send)
〈r(a) := c, (s˜, p, send)〉 −→P (update(s˜, r, a,False), p, send) .
We show that the following relation holds in Fig. 11:
s[r 7→ s(r) \ {R[[a]]p}] ∼m update(s˜, r, a,False) .
D Hierarchy of Abstract Domains
Fig. 12 provides a high-level view of the different network semantics.
E Example
Fig. 13a shows a simple network where two stateful firewalls are connected in a row to
prevent traffic between nodes h2 to h1. This is an artificial example meant to illustrate
the verification process. More realistic examples are presented in Sec. 5. It is assumed
that hosts h1 and h2 can send and receive arbitrary packets on channels e1 and e4,
respectively. The example is implemented using three middleboxes: two middleboxes,
fw1 and fw2, running firewalls that restrict traffic from left to right and from right to
left, respectively, and one middlebox, is, checking whether isolation between h2 and
h1 is preserved. In fw1, e2 is connected to the “internal” port and e3 is connected to
the “external” port, thus limiting traffic from right to left. In fw2, e4 is connected to the
“internal” port and e3 is connected to the “external” port, thus limiting traffic from left
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Cartesian network domain over Cartesian packet space domain:
M → (P → ℘(Q→ {True,False}))× (E → ℘(Π))
Concrete network domain: (M[M]  EP*)
with FIFO transitions: o (Sec. 3.2)
Concrete network domain: (M[M]  EP*)
with unordered transitions: u (Sec. 3.3)
Concrete network domain: (M[M]  EP*)
with reverting unordered transitions: ur (Sec. 3.3)
Concrete network domain: (M[M]  EP*)
with reverting transitions: or (Sec. 3.3)
Cartesian network domain: M([M])  E(P)
with abstract transformer                                 (Sec. 4.1)
Relation space domain: (R[M])
where R[m] : rels(m)(D(m)) (Sec. 2.2)
with relation effect transitions R
Parametric middlebox domain
with middlebox transitions 
Packet space domain: (P[M])
where P[m] : PQ{True,False} (Sec. 2.3)
with packet effect transitions P
Cartesian packet space domain:
P(Q{True,False})
with substate transitions P[p,p’] (Sec. 2.5)
(Sec. 2.4)
~
Middlebox abstraction
Network abstraction
Fig. 12: Hierarchy of abstractions. Solid edges stand for abstraction (either by relaxing
the transition relation or by abstracting the configurations). Dashed edges stand for
instantiation of the middlebox (local) semantics.
to right. In is, e1 is connected to the “internal” port and e2 is connected to the “external”
port.
Fig. 2 describes the code running in either of the session firewalls, fw1 and fw2.
We use CSP/OCCAM-like syntax where (messages) packets are sent/received asyn-
chronously. The middlebox non-deterministically operates on a packet from the “in-
ternal” port or the “external” port. When reading a packet from the “internal” port,
the program distinguishes between two cases. In the first case, a session had been pre-
viously established, and the packet is simply forwarded to the “external” port. In the
second case the type of the packet is a “request” packet (type=0), and the program
adds the destination host to the set of requested hosts and forwards the “request”.
The requested set is used to store the hosts to which the middlebox sent a “request”
packet, to avoid the case where a session is established with a host that the middlebox
did not send a “request” to. Packets that do not fall into any of these two cases are
discarded with no further processing.
When the middlebox reads a packet from the “external” port again it distinguishes
between two cases — in one case a session had previously been established, and is simi-
lar to its “internal” counterpart. In the second case, the processed packet is a “response”
packet (type=1) from a host that is in the requested set, and the program marks
the source of the packet as trusted, thus establishing a session. Other packets are
discarded.
A “data” packet (type=2) is implicitly handled by checking whether the source/des-
tination of the packet is in the trusted set, and if so, allowing the packet to propagate
on.
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(a) A network topology.
is = do
external_port ? p =>
if
p.src = forbidden => abort

true => internal_port ! p
fi

internal_port ? p =>
true => external_port ! p
od
(b) AMDL code for is.
Fig. 13: Network topology and AMDL code for the running example.
Fig. 13b describes the code running in a special middlebox, is, which intercepts
packets before they arrive to host h1 — the middlebox non- deterministically reads
a packet from the “external” port and aborts if the source of the packet is the host
forbidden = h2, and otherwise forwards to h1 on the “internal” port. On the other
direction, it simply forwards packets from the “internal” port to the “external” port. In
this example, is models the safety property.
E.1 Analysis Using Network Level Abstractions
Tab. 1 shows the run of our analysis, when restricted to the network-level abstractions,
on the running example. Each row corresponds to a step in the least fixpoint computa-
tion of the (abstract) reachable network states. Each column at the table represents the
abstract content of a channel (as a set of packets) or the abstract state of an individual
middlebox (as the contents of its set-valued variables). For each channel e,
→
e denotes
channels connecting traffic from left to the right, while
←
e denotes channels connecting
traffic from right to the left. For example,
→
e1 contains packets sent from h1 to is.
Channel abstract states are sets of packets.
For the firewall middleboxes, a (concrete) state is a pair of values for the requested
and trusted sets. An abstract state is a set of such (concrete) states. The isolation
middlebox is stateless.
At the initial configuration, the states of fw1 and fw2 are pairs of empty sets; the
states of channels
→
e1 and
←
e4 are all the packets that hosts h1 and h2 can send, respec-
tively.
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→
e1
←
e1
→
e2
←
e2 fw1
→
e3
←
e3 fw2
→
e4
←
e4 action
p(1,2,0)
p(1,2,1)
p(1,2,2)
∅ ∅ ∅ (∅, ∅) ∅ ∅ (∅, ∅) ∅
p(2,1,0)
p(2,1,1)
p(2,1,2)
initial state
p(1,2,0) is reads p(1,2,0)
p(1,2,0)
p(1,2,1)
is reads p(1,2,1)
p(1,2,0)
p(1,2,1)
p(1,2,2)
is reads p(1,2,2)
(∅, ∅)
({h2}, ∅) p(1,2,0) fw1 reads p(1,2,0)
fw1 reads p(1,2,1)
fw1 reads p(1,2,2)
p(2,1,0)
(∅, ∅)
({h1}, ∅) fw2 reads p(2,1,0)
fw2 reads p(2,1,1)
fw2 reads p(2,1,2)
fw1 reads p(2,1,0)
fw2 reads p(1,2,0)
Table 1: Modular analysis of the running example with explicit state representation.
Only changed values are shown. The abstract states of channels are sets. The abstract
states of firewalls are sets of pairs for the values of the requested and trusted
sets. Each cell in the table represent a set of the elements described within, except for
empty sets in the initial state. The notation p(i,j,k) stands for the packet from hi to hj
with type k.
The analysis ignores the correlations between different columns. At each step, the
analysis chooses an input channel and a middlebox state and computes the next state.
The analysis stops when no more new middlebox states or channel states are discov-
ered and reports potential violation of the safety property if the abort command is
executed.
In the first action, the code of is executes and reads (h1, h2, 0) from
→
e1. Notice that
this does not change the (abstract) content of this channel. The packet is forwarded to
→
e2.
Thus, our analysis only accumulates packets, ignoring their order. The reachable states
of the middleboxes are explicitly maintained. For example, when fw1 reads (h1, h2, 0)
from
→
e2, it forwards it to
→
e3 and reaches a new state with requested = {h2} and
trusted = ∅.
Notice that in this example, the analysis proved that the abort command can ever
be executed on arbitrary packet propagation scenarios. Specifically, no packets ever
reaches channel
←
e2, so the safety middlebox is never reads a packet that will result in the
execution of an abort command. Thus, the analysis succeeded in proving isolation.
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This example illustrates that, although our analysis employs Cartesian abstraction,
it is able to prove a network-wide property. Specifically, proving isolation requires rea-
soning about the states of both firewalls. We note that removing either of the firewalls
violates the safety property.
E.2 Analysis Using Network Level and Middlebox Level Abstractions
Tab. 2 shows the verification process with packet states in the running example. Instead
of storing the contents of relations trusted and requested in each middlebox
state, we store, for each packet, whether each of the expressions “p.dst in trusted”,
“p.src in trusted”, and “p.src in requested”, evaluates to True (T ) or
False (F ), respectively.
Since both relations are empty in the initial state, the packet states for both firewalls
map each packet to (F, F, F ).
Recall that when fw1 reads (h1, h2, 0) from
→
e2, it forwards it to
→
e3 and reaches a new
state with requested = {h2} and trusted = ∅. Therefore, any future evaluation
of the expression “p.src in requested” (for any value of type) should result in
True. Under the packet state representation, this would result in adding to the abstract
state of fw1 a packet state similar to that of the initial state where each of the packets
p(2,1,0), p(2,1,1), and p(2,1,2) is re- mapped from (F, F, F ) to (F, F, T ). Our middlebox-
level Cartesian abstraction allows us to instead accumulate these mappings (separated
by a horizontal line from the initial mappings) in a single abstract state, without affecting
the overall precision of the abstract interpretation.
A similar change to the packet state of fw2 occurs upon reading the packet (h2, h1, 0)
from
←
e4.
F Networks with unbounded number of hosts
In this section, we prove the lack of small model to stateful networks, w.r.t number
of network hosts. This property holds even for reverting networks with only a single
middlebox and packets of the type (s, d, t) where s and d are hosts i.e., s, d ∈ H , and
t, the packet type, is taken from a bounded type set T .
Small model property. For simplicity, we consider only a network with a single mid-
dlebox m that never output packets. The small model property is a bound b(m), such
that any network with the above topology is safe if and only if any network with the
above topology and at most b(m) hosts is safe. And if for certain number of hosts the
network is not safe, we define b(m) =∞.
Theorem 5. The function b(m) is not a computable function. In particular, the problem
of deciding whether b(m) <∞ is undecidable.
We prove the above theorem by a reduction to the halting problem. We show that giving
a Turing machine M , we can construct a middlebox m(M) such that b(m(M)) =∞ if
and only if M is never halts and is using unbounded space on its run when then initial
input is empty (which is known to be undecidable).
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→
c1
←
c1
→
c2
←
c2 fw1
→
c3
←
c3 fw2
→
c4
←
c4 action
p(1,2,0)
p(1,2,1)
p(1,2,2)
∅ ∅ ∅
p(1,2,0) 7→ (F, F, F )
p(1,2,1) 7→ (F, F, F )
p(1,2,2) 7→ (F, F, F )
p(2,1,0) 7→ (F, F, F )
p(2,1,1) 7→ (F, F, F )
p(2,1,2) 7→ (F, F, F )
∅ ∅
p(1,2,0) 7→ (F, F, F )
p(1,2,1) 7→ (F, F, F )
p(1,2,2) 7→ (F, F, F )
p(2,1,0) 7→ (F, F, F )
p(2,1,1) 7→ (F, F, F )
p(2,1,2) 7→ (F, F, F )
∅
p(2,1,0)
p(2,1,1)
p(2,1,2)
initial state
p(1,2,0) is reads p(1,2,0)
p(1,2,0)
p(1,2,1)
is reads p(1,2,1)
p(1,2,0)
p(1,2,1)
p(1,2,2)
is reads p(1,2,2)
p(1,2,0) 7→ (F, F, F )
p(1,2,1) 7→ (F, F, F )
p(1,2,2) 7→ (F, F, F )
p(2,1,0) 7→ (F, F, F )
p(2,1,1) 7→ (F, F, F )
p(2,1,2) 7→ (F, F, F )
p(2,1,0) 7→ (F, F, T )
p(2,1,1) 7→ (F, F, T )
p(2,1,2) 7→ (F, F, T )
p(1,2,0) fw1 reads p(1,2,0)
fw1 reads p(1,2,1)
fw1 reads p(1,2,2)
p(2,1,0)
p(1,2,0) 7→ (F, F, F )
p(1,2,1) 7→ (F, F, F )
p(1,2,2) 7→ (F, F, F )
p(2,1,0) 7→ (F, F, F )
p(2,1,1) 7→ (F, F, F )
p(2,1,2) 7→ (F, F, F )
p(1,2,0) 7→ (F, F, T )
p(1,2,1) 7→ (F, F, T )
p(1,2,2) 7→ (F, F, T )
fw2 reads p(2,1,0)
fw2 reads p(2,1,1)
fw2 reads p(2,1,2)
fw1 reads p(2,1,0)
fw2 reads p(1,2,0)
Table 2: Packet state enumeration for the running example. The abstract states of chan-
nels are sets of packets. The abstract states of middleboxes are relations over packets
and query valuations; each entry in the table is denoted by 7→. Each cell in the table rep-
resent a set of the elements described within, except for empty sets in the initial state.
The horizontal lines in the fw1 and fw2 columns appear to emphasize the changes. As
before, p(i,j,k) stands for the packet from hi to hj with type k.
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Proof overview Given a Turing machine M over alphabet σ we construct a network
with a single middlebox m and a host set H and packet space P = H ×H × T such
thatN is safe if and only ifM does not halts for any run that requires at least |H| space.
Informally, we construct m such that initially m encodes a successor relation over
H , and later it uses the relation to simulate the run of the Turing machine m for |H|
cells in the turing machine tape. If in using at most |H| space the Turing machine halts,
then m goes to an abort state. Hence, N is safe iff M does not halt using at most |H|
space.
Detailed proof sketch We assume a constant symbol h0 (the first host). For the suc-
cessor construction, the middlebox m has the next relations:
– Rsuccessor(h1, h2). Intuitively, Rsuccessor(h1, h2) = True stands for h1 = h2 +
1. Initially, the relation returns false to all pairs.
– Rmax host(h). Intuitively, Rmax host(h) = True, if h was the last host that was
assigned as a successor. Initially, only Rmax host(h0) = True.
– Ralready in order(h). Intuitively, Ralready in order(h) = True if h was already
assigned as a successor. Initially only Ralready in order(h0) = True.
In the successor construction phase, m construct an order, given an input packet
(s, d, t) as follows: If Rmax host(s) is false or Ralready in order(d) is true, it goes to
a sink state. Otherwise it set Rmax host(s) = False, Ralready in order(d) = True,
Rmax host(d) = True and Rsuccessor(s, d) = True. A special packet type t = 1
indicates that m should leave the successor construction phase and go to simulation
phase.
To describe the simulation phase, we first recall that a Turing machine has a finite
set of states Q and a finite input/output alphabet Σ. In every step, the machine reads
an input from the head, write a new symbol to head, and moves the head one step to
the right or to the left (w.l.o.g, we assume that head position is changed in every step).
At this phase, hosts represent turing machine head position. For the Turing machine
simulation phase the middlebox has the next relations:
– For every σ ∈ Σ: Rsymbol
σ
(h). Intuitively, it is true if and only if the symbol on
the h− th position is σ. Initially, it is false for all pairs.
– Rexpected position(h). Intuitively, it is true if and only if the head is expected to
be in position h. Initially, only Rexpected position(h0) is true.
– For every q ∈ Q: Rstateq () is true iff the machine is at state q. Initially, only
Rstateq0 () is true.
In this state, m simulates the machine as follows: given a packet (s, d, t):
– Check head position: If Rexpected position(s) = False go to sink state.
– Query head symbol: go over all Rsymbol
σ
(s) and extract current head symbol σ
(if it is false for all symbols, then the cell is empty, i.e., σ = ).
– Query current state: go over all Rstateq () and extract current state q.
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– Update head symbol and current state: setRsymbol
σ
(s) = False andRsymbol′
σ
(s) =
True where σ′ is the output symbol (according to the turing machine). Similarly
update the current state relation.
– Update expected head position: If at state q and input σ the head moves left, then if
d 6= s− 1 (according to the successor relation) then go to sink state. Otherwise set
Rexpected position(s) = False, and Rexpected position(d) = True. If the head
moves right, check if d = s+ 1 and act in the same way.
– if q is a final state, then abort.
Lemma 9. The network is safe if and only if M does not halt using at most |H| space.
Proof. If M halts using at most |H| space, then a sequence of packets which construct
the order and simulate the run without going to a sink state leads to an abort state. If M
does not halt with at most |H| space, then any sequence of packets must end in a sink
state.
Additional observations
– The program is only using the inputs s, d and t and a single constant h0. In the
construction it is enough to have t ∈ {0, 1}.
– Same proof holds for reverting middlebox. Indeed, whenever the middlebox reverts,
the state of the turing machine and the relation order are reset, and the run starts
from scratch. This is thanks to the fact that m does not output any packets.
